# Intermediate Microeconomics

# Part A: Supply and Demand

## **Demand and Supply Elasticity**

price elasticity of demand = 
$$\epsilon = \frac{\text{percentage change in quantity demanded}}{\text{percentage change in price}} = \frac{\Delta Q/Q_1}{\Delta p/p_1} = \frac{\Delta Q p_1}{\Delta p Q_1} = b \frac{p}{Q}$$

Where b is the gradient of the demand function if it is linear and expressed with Q as the subject

price elasticity of supply = 
$$\eta = \frac{\text{percentage change in quantity supplied}}{\text{percentage change in price}} = \frac{\Delta Q/Q}{\Delta p/p} = \frac{\Delta Qp}{\Delta pQ} = b\frac{p}{Q}$$

Where b is the gradient of the supply function if it is linear and expressed with Q as the subject

income elasticity of demand = 
$$\xi = \frac{\text{percentage change in quantity demanded}}{\text{percentage change in income}} = \frac{\Delta Q/Q}{\Delta Y/Y} = \frac{\Delta Q \times Y}{\Delta Y \times Q}$$

$$\text{cross price elasticity of demand} = \frac{\text{percentage change in quantity demanded}}{\text{percentage change in price of other good}} = \frac{\Delta Q/Q}{\Delta p_o/p_o} = \frac{\Delta Q \times p_o}{\Delta p_o \times Q}$$

## **Specific Taxes**

In response to a specific tax:

$$\Delta p = \left(\frac{\eta}{\eta - \epsilon}\right) \Delta \tau$$

Where  $\tau$  is the size of the specific tax (note that  $\epsilon$  will usually be negative)

### **Tax Incidence**

tax incidence on consumers 
$$=\frac{\Delta p}{\Delta \tau} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - \epsilon}$$

# **Part B: Consumer Theory**

### **Basic Concepts**

### **Marginal Rate of Substitution**

Marginal rate of substitution (of y for x) = slope of indifference curve = 
$$MRS = \frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = -\frac{MU_x}{MU_y}$$

### **Budget Constraint**

Assume that a consumer has preferences over goods B and Z, where B is plotted in the y-axis

$$m = Y = p_B B + p_Z Z$$

$$Y - p_z Z = p_B B$$

$$B = \frac{Y - p_z Z}{p_B}$$

$$B = \frac{Y}{p_B} - \frac{p_Z}{p_B} Z$$

### **Marginal Rate of Transformation**

Marginal rate of transformation = slope of budget constraint =  $MRT = -\frac{p_Z}{p_B}$ 

### **At Consumer Equilibrium**

$$MRS = MRT = -\frac{MU_z}{MU_B} = -\frac{p_Z}{p_B} = \frac{\Delta B}{\Delta Z}$$

### **Special Cases of Indifference Curves**

Perfect substitutes: straight diagonal line joining two axes

Perfect complements: must be used in one-to-one ratio, series of points and straight lines

Useless goods: vertical or horizontal lines

### **Substitution and Income Effects**

### **Income and Substitution Effects**

Substitution effect =  $Q^* - Q_1$ 

Where  $Q_1$  is the original quantity consumed and  $Q^{\ast}$  is the quantity consumed at the new prices but on the old indifference curve

Income effect = 
$$Q_2 - Q^*$$

Where  $Q_2$  is the new quantity consumed and  $Q^{\ast}$  is the quantity consumed at the new prices but on the old indifference curve

Total effect = substitution effect + income effect

### **Types of Goods**

Income effect < 0 = Inferior good

Income effect  $> 0 = normal\ good$ 

Income effect + Substitution effect < 0 = Giffen good

### **Types of Curves**

Price consumption curve: downward sloping = substitutes, upward sloping = complements

Demand curve: usually downward sloping, upward sloping only for giffen goods

Income consumption curve: upward sloping = normal good, downward sloping = inferior good

Engel curve: upward sloping = normal good, downward sloping = inferior good

### **Own-Price Slutsky Equation**

The slutsky equation shows that the elasticity of demand for a good  $(\epsilon)$  is the sum of the substitution elasticity of demand  $(\epsilon^*)$  and the income elasticity of demand  $(\xi)$ 

Total effect = substitution effect + income effect

$$\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p} = \left(\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p}\right)_{U=constant} - q \frac{\Delta q}{\Delta Y}$$

$$\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p} \frac{p}{q} = \left(\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p} \frac{p}{q}\right)_{U=constant} - q \frac{\Delta q}{\Delta Y} \frac{p}{q} \frac{Y}{Y}$$

$$\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p} \frac{p}{q} = \left(\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta p} \frac{p}{q}\right)_{U=constant} - \frac{qp}{Y} \times \frac{\Delta q}{\Delta Y} \frac{Y}{q}$$

$$\epsilon = \epsilon^* - s \xi$$

Where s is the budget share of the good

### **Cross-Price Slutsky Equation**

$$\begin{split} \frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta p_2} &= \left(\frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta p_2}\right)_{\text{U}=constant} - q_2 \frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta Y} \\ \frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta p_2} \frac{p_2}{q_1} &= \left(\frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta p_2} \frac{p_2}{q_1}\right)_{\text{U}=constant} - \frac{q_2 p_2}{Y} \times \frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta Y} \frac{Y}{q_1} \\ \epsilon_1^2 &= {\epsilon_1^2}^* - s_2 \xi_1 \end{split}$$

Where  $\epsilon_1^2$  is the cross-price elasticity for good 1 associated with a price change in good 2

## **Applications of Consumer Theory**

### **Labour Budget Constraint**

$$pC = wH + G$$

Where G is non-labour income, C is consumption of goods and services, and H is hours of work

### **Time Constraint**

$$H = T - L$$

### Cash v. In-Kind Transfers

If  $Q_1 \ge G$  then indifferent between cash and gift If  $Q_1 < G$  then probably prefer cash

Where G is the amount of good 1 given as an in-kind gift

### **Decision Making Under Uncertainty**

### **Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference**

If  $(x_1, x_2)$  is revealed preferred to  $(y_1, y_2)$  and the bundles are not identical, then it cannot be true that  $(y_1, y_2)$  is also revealed preferred to  $(x_1, x_2)$ 

Non-transitive preferences are not ruled out by the weak axiom

# **Expected Utility**

$$u = \pi_1 u(c_1) + \pi_2 u(c_2)$$

Where  $\pi$  is the probability of the relevant event occurring  $c_i$  is the payoff from that event. Note that we assume independence in the utility between these two events.

### **Risk Premium**

Risk Premium = Expected Wealth (from gamble) - Certainty Equivalent Wealth 
$$R^* = EW - CEW$$

The certainty-equivalent wealth (CEW) is the level of certain wealth that provides the same amount of utility as the expected utility of the gamble

For a risk-loving individual, the risk premium will be negative

### **Expected Insurance Profits**

$$E(\pi) = p(R_S - L) + (1 - p)R_S = R_S - pL$$

Where  $R_S$  is the size of the insurance premium, L is the size of the loss and p is the probability of the loss

### **Viable Insurance Market**

A viable insurance market exists if the following is satisfied

$$pL \le R \le R^*$$

Where R is the actual premium and  $R^*$  is the maximum premium the individual will pay

### **Segregated Market**

$$E(\pi) = R_S - (s_L p_L + s_H p_H) L$$

Where S is the proportion of low/high risk personas and p is their respective probabilities of incurring loss L

Competition will force profits to zero, such that  $R_S = (s_L p_L + s_H p_H)L$ 

### **Part C: Production and Costs**

### **Basic Concepts**

### **Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution**

marginal rate of technical substitution = slope of isoquant = 
$$-\frac{MP_L}{MP_K}$$

Note that this applies if capital is graphed on the y-axis

### **Marginal Cost Formulae**

Assume that capital is fixed

$$MC = \frac{dVC}{dQ} = \frac{d(wL)}{dQ} = w\left(\frac{dL}{dQ}\right) = w\frac{1}{MP_L} = \frac{w}{MP_L}$$

### **Iso-Cost Line**

The following is based on the assumption that K is plotted on the y-axis

$$TC = wL + rK$$

$$TC - wL = rK$$

$$K = \frac{TC - wL}{r}$$

$$K = \frac{TC}{r} - \frac{w}{r}L$$

### **Marginal Rate of Technical Transformation**

This is the slope of Iso-Cost Line

$$\frac{\Delta K}{\Delta L} = -\frac{w}{r}$$

### At Producer Equilibrium

The firm selects a desired level of output, and then selects that bundle of inputs that produces this output at the lowest cost

$$\frac{\Delta K}{\Delta L} = -\frac{W}{r} = -\frac{MP_L}{MP_W} = MRTS$$

### **Finding Industry Characteristics**

### **Find Supply Curve**

The supply curve for a single competitive firm can be found by differentiating the total cost function, equating MC with price, and then rearranging the resulting equation so price is the subject. Industry supply can be found by multiplying this supply curve by the number of firms. Always given with p as the subject, same as the demand curve.

### **Output Expansion Path**

If K is on the y-axis, the output expansion path with be in the form K = f(L). If relative prices are not known, they must be included as variables in the equation. Note that the following are the conditions that the output expansion path must satisfy

$$\frac{\Delta K}{\Delta L} = -\frac{W}{r} = -\frac{MP_L}{MP_K} = MRTS$$

### **Cost-Minimising Bundles**

These can be calculated by writing L and K as a function of q, substituting out the other one (K or L)

Also,  $MP_L \times p_x = w$ , where x is the good being produced (same holds for capital in LR)

### **Total Cost Function**

This will be found by substituting the optimal bundles of K and L (relative to q) into equation TC = wL + rK

### **Other Formulae**

### **Residual Demand**

$$D_R = D - S_o$$

Where  $S_o$  is the total quantity supplied of all other firms

### **Elasticity of Residual Demand**

Note that the following only applies when all firms are identical

$$\epsilon_{RD} = N\epsilon_D - (N-1)\eta S_O$$

Where N is the number of firms. As  $N \rightarrow \text{infinity}$ , the residual demand curve becomes perfectly elastic

#### **Link Between Production and Profits**

$$\pi(\text{max})$$
 when  $MP_L \times p = MC_L$ 

**Calculating Profits** 

$$\pi = q(p - AVC) - FC$$

# Part D: General Equilibrium

### **Endowment Economy Equilibrium**

Note that A subscripts refer to consumer A, and B subscripts to consumer B. Similarly, this is an economy of two goods x and y. M refers to the value of the initial bundle.

$$MRS_A = -\frac{p_y}{p_x} = MRS_B$$

$$m_A = x_A p_x + y_A p_y$$

$$m_A = x_A p_x + y_A p_y$$

$$m_B = x_B p_x + y_B p_y$$

### **Production Possibility Frontier**

Will always be in the form Y = f(X), where Y is the good on the vertical axis and X on the horizontal axis

## **Full Competitive Equilibrium**

Under equilibrium with perfect competition, both of the following will be satisfied:

$$MRS_1 = -\frac{MU_{z_1}}{MU_{B_1}} = -\frac{p_z}{p_B} = -\frac{MU_{z_2}}{MU_{B_2}} = MRS_2$$

$$MRTS_1 = -\frac{MP_{L_1}}{MP_{K_1}} = -\frac{w}{r} = -\frac{MP_{L_2}}{MP_{K_2}} = MRTS_2$$

$$MRS = MRT$$

Note that Competitive Equilibria don't have to be points of pareto efficiency, something that occurs if there is a tax on one firm but not the other and so they face different prices.

Also note that when calculating general equilibrium, check whether it is production, consumption or both

### Part E: Market Structure

### **Generalities**

### **Market Parameters**

- 1. Many or few firms?
- 2. Short or long run?
- 3. Marginal costs the same or different?
- 4. Homogenous goods?

- 5. Set price or quantity?
- 6. Sequential or simultaneous?

### **Marginal Revenue**

Note that if MC differs across firms, must recalculate TR for each firm separately

This is useful when demand curve not given

$$MR = p \times \left[1 + \frac{s_i}{\epsilon_D}\right]$$

Note that  $s_i$  indicates market share as a number between one and zero

For a linear demand curve, the formula for marginal revenue will be the same as the formula for the demand curve, but with twice the gradient

**Residual Demand** 

$$q_1 = Q - q_2$$

**Price Markup** 

$$\frac{p - MC}{p} = -\frac{1}{N\epsilon_D}$$

Where N is the number of firms in the market

### **Types of Markets**

### **Perfect Competition**

In the Short-Run:  $p = MC \neq AVC$ ,  $\therefore \pi > 0$ 

In the Long-Run:  $p = MC = \min(AVC)$ 

Note that the demand curve in a PC market is the MC curve above AVC: firm will shut down when p < AVC

### **Monopoly**

If two firms collude to act as a joint monopolist, the firm with lower marginal costs will produce everything

$$MR = MC$$

$$MR = \frac{d(PQ)}{dO} = \text{twice gradient of demand curve}$$

If the firms have different marginal costs, these can be combined (taking the lowest value) to form a new cost function as if the two firms were a single monopolist.

### **Cournot Oligopoly**

To calculate the optimum levels of output for each firm, we derive a function for profits and then differentiate it to find the maximum value.

$$\pi_A = Pq_A - MCq_A$$

### **Bertrand Oligopoly**

Note that when firms set output by price, the best response function must always be written with p as the subject. The easiest way to solve these is to write a formula for profits, differentiate it and equate to zero to get maximum value.

Best Response for Firm 1:

$$RF_{1}(p_{2}) = \begin{cases} p_{m} & \text{if } p_{2} > p_{m} \\ p_{2} - \varepsilon & \text{if MC} < p_{2} \leq p_{m} \\ \text{MC} & \text{if } p_{2} < \text{MC} \end{cases}$$

Best Response for Firm 2:

$$RF_{2}(p_{1}) = \begin{cases} p_{m} & \text{if } p_{1} > p_{m} \\ p_{1} - \varepsilon & \text{if MC} < p_{1} \leq p_{m} \\ MC & \text{if } p_{1} < MC \end{cases}$$

Where  $p_m$  is the monopoly price,  $\epsilon$  is an increment, and MC is marginal cost

### **Stackelburg Oligopoly**

First calculate the best response function of the follower relative to the output of the leader, and then substitute this into the leader's <u>demand function</u> in order to solve for its optimal output. Note that when calculating a Cournot oligopoly we must independently calculate each firm's residual demand and then best response curves, and only substitute one into the other after we have derived each independently. For a firm with a first mover advantage, however, it can act before the other firm, and so totally internalise its actions into its own residual demand and best response function. This is why for a Stackelburg Oligopoly we substitute the best response function of the follower firm directly in the residual demand of the leader.

### **Monopolistic Competition**

In the short run, problem is just like monopolist expect that we use residual demand instead of market demand:  $p > AC > MR_R = MC$ 

In the long run ATC = P, so profits = 0. Owing to fixed costs and consequent barriers to entry, however, p > MC:  $p = AC > MR_R = MC$ 

### **Taxes and Prices**

- constant-cost: price rises by full amount of the tax
- increasing cost: price rises by less than increase in tax—but lower input prices


# **Graphs and Diagrams**

# **Consumer Theory**


# **Special Indifference Curves**

Lecture 3, slide 19


# A Useless Good?



### Perfect Substitutes




# Perfect Complements



# **Budget Constraint**


Lecture 4, slide 11



### **Corner Solution**


Lecture 4, slide 19

# Individual's Optimal Choice—Corner Solution




### **Cash Versus in Kind Transfers**

Lecture 4, slide 24




# **Price-Consumption and Demand Curve**

Lecture 5, slide 6




# **Income-Consumption and Engel Curve**

Lecture 5, slides 8 & 10




### **Income and Substitution Effects**

Lecture 5, slide 17



# **Fully Labelled Indifference Curve**


Lecture 6, slide 11, note that F stands for food



# **Applications of Consumer Theory**

# Per Unit or Lump Sum Tax


Exam 2009, B-1



# **Labour-Leisure Market**


Lecture 7, slide 9

### Consumption




### **Leisure Normal**

Lecture 7, slide 15




### **Inconsistent with WARP**

Lecture 8, slide 6




### **Consistent with WARP**

Lecture 8, slide 9




### **Risk Averse Individual**




# **Risk Loving Individual**

Lecture 8, slide 27



### **Insurance Market**


Lecture 9, slide 9



# **Production and Costs**

# **Fixed Proportions Production Function**

Lecture 10, slide 23 and Tutorial Solutions 5








Figure 2: Question 2 (d)


# **Varying Returns to Scale**

Lecture 11, slide 8




### **Short-Run Costs**






# **Cost Minimizing Input Bundles**

Lecture 12, slide 14




# **Change in Input Prices**

Lecture 12, slide 28



# **Output Expansion Path**


Lecture 12, slide 20



# **Perfect Competition**


# **Short-Run Equilibrium**

Lecture 13, slide 12




# **Short Run Supply Curve**

Lecture 13, slide 19




# **Making Losses**

Lecture 13, slide 16




# **Constant-Cost Industry**

Lecture 14, slide 8




Lecture 14, slide 13




### **Short-Run Taxes**

Lecture 14, slide 16




### **Long-Run Taxes**

Lecture 14, slide 16



### **Lump Sum Taxes**

**Additional Notes** 



now: P, = semc(q) but P, < SRAC, -> LOSS = p, abc | each firm produces more industry output falls

initially q: P= SRMC(q) point c | initially q: P= LRMC(q) = LRACo(q)

P= SRACo

T=0


SR 1----| SR losses induce exit until b|  $P_2 = LRm(q_2) = LRM(q_2)$ 

# **General Equilibrium**

### **Endowments Market**


Lecture 15, slide 15






### **Contract Curve**

Lecture 15, slide 20



# Non-Equilibrium


Lecture 15, slide 26



# **Production Equilibrium**

Lecture 16, slide 12


ch's labour




fw's labour

# **Production Possibilities Frontier**

Lecture 16, slide 16







# **Market Structure**

# **Monopoly Linear Demand Curve**


Lecture 17, slide 10






# **Cournot Duopoly**

Lecture 19, slide 15




# **Bertrand Homogenous Products**

Lecture 20, slide 12




### **Bertrand Differentiated Products**

Lecture 20, slide 17




### **Stackelburg Sequential**

Lecture 21, slide 12




### **Comparing Models**

Lecture 21, slide 14




### **Monopolistic Short-Run Equilibrium**

Lecture 22, slide 6




# Monopolistic Long-Run Equilibrium

Lecture 22, slide 10



# **Monopolistic SR Taxes**

Lecture 22, slide 16



## **Exam Tips and Notes**

### **Tricky Questions**

Pink 2:3, Pink 3:3, Blue 4:3b, Pink 4:3, Pink 5:1c, Pink 5:2, Blue 6:2b, Pink 6:2 & 3, Pink 7:3, Pink 8, Blue 8, Pink 10, Blue 11:1 & 2, Pink 11:1

### **Types of Calculations**

### Part A: Supply and Demand

- Basic market equilibrium
- Effect of taxes on equilibrium

### **Part B: Consumer Theory**

- Draw indifference curves and calculate MRS
- Write equation for and draw graph of budget constraint (including with non-constant price)
- Calculate if utility maximisation is satisfied
- Calculate consumer equilibrium and changes with taxes
- Plot income-consumption curve
- Plot Engel curve
- Calculate income elasticity
- Calculate and graph income and substitution effects
- Calculate and graph optimum consumption bundles with changing prices
- Plot wage leisure diagram
- Analyse effects of wage and tax changes on workforce participation
- Show tax revenue on wage diagram

### **Part C: Decision Making Under Uncertainty**

- Construct bundle table to check consistency with WARP
- Calculate expected utility
- Model an insurance market
- Calculate preference for or against insurance

### **Part D: Production and Costs**

- \*\* Mixing production methods
- Derive expressions for cost functions
- Derive expression for expansion path
- Determine the cost-minimizing labour and capital inputs
- Find equilibrium prices, outputs and supply curves for competitive firms
- Find equilibrium in short and long run

### Part E: General Equilibrium

- Determine point of consumption efficiency in pure endowment economy
- Determine equilibrium of pure endowment economy
- Calculate formula for production possibility frontier
- Determine point of production efficiency in production economy

### **Part F: Market Structure**

- Calculate profit-maximising output for monopoly, including with changes with taxes
- Calculate optimum responses and profit levels for collusive and Cournot oligopolies
- Fully model Bertrand strategic competition
- Fully model Stackelburg competition
- Fully model monopolistic competition

### The Essential Formulae

$$\epsilon = \frac{\text{percentage change in quantity demanded}}{\text{percentage change in price}} = \frac{\Delta Q/Q_1}{\Delta p/p_1} = \frac{\Delta Qp_1}{\Delta pQ_1} = b\frac{p}{Q}$$

$$\text{tax incidence on consumers} = \frac{\Delta p}{\Delta \tau} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - \epsilon}$$

If 
$$\epsilon$$
 is constant, then with tax  $\tau$ :  $Q_2 = \frac{p_1}{(tax\ incidence \times \tau) + p_1} \times Q_1$ 

MRS of good y for good 
$$x = \frac{MU_x}{MU_y}$$

$$\frac{\Delta K}{\Delta L} = -\frac{w}{r} = -\frac{\mathrm{MP_L}}{\mathrm{MP_K}} = MRTS$$

$$TC = Lw + rK$$

$$MRS_A = -\frac{p_x}{p_y} = MRS_B$$

Risk Premium = Expected Wealth (from gamble) - Certainty Equivalent Wealth  $R^* = EW - CEW$ 

$$m_A = x_A p_x + y_A p_y$$

$$m_B = x_B p_x + y_B p_y$$

$$MRS_1 = -\frac{MU_{Z_1}}{MU_{B_1}} = -\frac{p_Z}{p_B} = -\frac{MU_{Z_2}}{MU_{B_2}} = MRS_2$$

$$MRTS_1 = -\frac{MP_{L_1}}{MP_{K_1}} = -\frac{w}{r} = -\frac{MP_{L_2}}{MP_{K_2}} = MRTS_2$$

$$MRS = MRT$$

$$price markup = \frac{p - MC}{p} = -\frac{1}{N\epsilon_D}$$

$$MR = p \times \left[1 + \frac{s_i}{\epsilon_D}\right]$$

$$MR = \frac{dTR}{da}$$

### **Points to Note**

- Always look carefully at all multiple choice options
- Read the question very carefully
- Do math slowly and check over it
- Its called an iso-cost line, same output for lower cost!
- If collusive firms have different costs, pick the one with lowest MC ignore fixed costs
- When calculating expected utility, probabilities always go outside the brackets of the function for calculating utility
- For calculating optimal dispersion of investments, incorporate return on safe asset into both good and bad scenarios before differentiating
- When calculating revealed preference, be sure to use the original prices for different bundles; best to put prices in the rows, bundles in the columns
- When doing a calculation using two different methods of production, sum the contributions of this input by each of the two production methods being used, weighted according to x, which is the proportion produced using the first production method
- If a firm sets is price, then to calculate marginal revenue its residual demand curve must be rearranged so that q is the subject, whereas if it sets quantity, it must be rearranged so that p is the subject (as these are the unknowns)
- For a market with dominant and fringe firms, first calculate the supply function for the competitive firms on the basis that their p = MC, and then substitute this into residual demand of dominant firm
- Gross effects refer to the situation as a whole, price and substitution effects both included, whereas net effects refer only to the substitution effect, with the income effect controlled for